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Education For Professional Responsibility
Robert E. Mathews*
There are three reasons why I am happy to be here today.
Most obviously, it is an honor of major proportions to be invited
to participate in a Centennial of a great university. I am not
accustomed to participating in centennials and I suspect that I
may not be very good at it; in any event, I've never once been
invited back to the second centennial of any institution that has
invited me to the first. So perhaps I should more wisely note that
this is also the 54th anniversary of a great law school and the
29th of a great medical school. Thus, at least in terms of the
mortality tables I do not enhance my prospects for a return
engagement.
Moreover, I like speaking on this topic. Each time I do it, I
try again with renewed hope that at least I may have found a
new way to express a thought that, I believe, has real significance. Thus am I grateful for this further opportunity to have
another try.
But I have a third reason that is very close to my heart.
Almost sixteen months ago your law school lost one of the truly
great members of your faculty. At one time he was a student
of mine; for over 12 years he was a cooperating editor with me
on a three-volume work and later its chairman; throughout his
whole life he was a true scholar, a man of principle, a man of
great personal courage and magnificent character. I consider
my visit here as something of a pilgrimage, an opportunity to
pay this homage to a man who exemplified better than any
words the subject of this talk: Charles A. Reynard.
Dean Wade has given us a searching analysis and a refreshingly new approach to the ideals of our profession. It is my notso-small task to discuss how it is that we may better inculcate
in our students the desire to attain them. Superficially this is a
misleadingly easy topic to discuss; it lends itself admirably to
vacuous generalizations. On the other hand, it is one that is
extraordinarily difficult to discuss with any real prospect of
usefulness.
*Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
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For one thing, the subject matter has been aired so often as
to have lost its freshness. Both words and ideas tend to do so
even precious ones, like freedom, democracy, and the dignity of
the individual. So it has come to be with professional responsibility. These are words that have been repeated so often as to
have lost their capacity to evoke response, to induce critical
thought; much as, I am told, the effectiveness of penicillin decreases with the repetition of its use.
I should gravely doubt that the intern who gives inductees
their anti-tetanus shots at the rate of 85 to 100 an hour gives
thereby a less effective shot to the hundredth than to the first,
but his own responses must have become increasingly dulled,
free of thought, of considered judgment; must have degenerated
to a mechanical act whose supervision has been abandoned to
the lower reaches of the nervous system. With a speaker, this
risk is doubled. Not only is there danger that he himself has lost
his freshness of approach but, unlike the serum, his message
too may have suffered in the same way. It could well be that
Mrs. Malaprop, were she to have heard any two of his discourses,
would have observed in some pain how "directly the similitude
struck her."
How then does one get below the surface of a topic like this?
A philosopher would have resources of his own and a minister
of the gospel could call for Divine Guidance with some reasonable hope of succor. But where does a lawyer go for aid, one
who is but an untrained layman in the subject he finds himself
discussing?
For one thing, he can avoid definitions. They are snares for
both definer and definee. Moreover, they are tedious. Even the
Taft-Hartley Act, scarcely an outstanding source of gaiety and
badinage, has relegated its 13 definitions to Section 2 and opens
with a series of policy statements that by comparison are sheer
delight.
While I realize that I am fully entitled to assume that a university audience shares a common understanding, however vague,
of the nature of what we call education, I shall for the sake of
good measure, as it were, toss in a sentence from Whitehead.
After some devastating remarks on the pedantry and harmfulness of inert, unused ideas, he commends warmly the relation
of ideas. "to that stream, compounded of sense perception, feel-
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ings, hopes, desires and of mental activities adjusting thought to
thought, which forms our life." He then concludes: "Education
is the acquisition of the art of the utilization of knowledge."'
Quite obviously there is implicit here a value judgment that
the utilization will serve desirable purposes. Here it is, I think,
that we come upon the concept of responsibility. Perhaps I shall
be forgiven if I make a tentative assumption here, this time with
no Whitehead to point it up, that a university audience shares
also a common sense of the nature of responsibility. I am not
referring to the perception that each of us senses so clearly of
the responsibility under which other folks labor, for that is a
perception that all people share, not merely this audience. Rather,
I have in mind a sense of self-responsibility sufficiently perceptive to make further definition of it here unnecessary. At the
risk then of seeming irresponsible in failing to define responsibility I must leave these assumptions and get on at once to something closer to the topic of this conference - in short, to what it
is we mean by "professional."
There is, I fear, no proper way this time to by-pass a definition. As in Taft-Hartley, at least this vestige of Section 2 must
of necessity remain. And the reason is close at hand. Even
though a mutual understanding of "education" and "responsibility" may, in generic terms, be taken for granted, their application to the professions is quite another matter. One must
have given thought to what it is that is a "profession" before he
can speak, with any hope of successful communication, of what
its responsibilities may be and how he would educate for them.
Perhaps the best known definition of a profession is the one
just quoted by Dean Wade. It was uttered only seven years ago
by Roscoe Pound. 2 To him a profession is "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of a public
service."
My medical friends will agree, I am sure, that the major
factor that sets our occupations apart from other honorable but
non-professional callings, is the final thought: the spirit of
public service. Moreover, take note that it is a service that is
public; that is, in other words, not merely to one's private clients
and patients but to others as well. Without this sort of service in
substantial degree, what we are devoting our lives to is unworthy
1. WHITEHEAD, THE AIMS OF EDUCATION (1932).
2. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TnmEs 5 (1953).
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of the privileged title "profession." It is education for this service that concerns us here today,
I believe that the world will concede, not grudgingly but
warmly, that in one vital respect we are serving our clients and
patients well; we are giving them the protection of high skill
and competence and we are giving it with sound discretion and
wise judgment. But for a professional man competence is not
enough; competence is minimal only, even though supported by
knowledge and guided by wise judgment. One of the great law
teachers and scholars of all-time, Floyd Russel Mechem, once
said:
"Think what it would mean if the thirty-five hundred or
so of young men who now go out yearly from these law
schools to every town and city in the land could go with not
only the best possible training in the law, but with the highest
possible ideals as to its duties and responsibilities and the
strongest possible ambition for its improvement and advancement."s
That was a magnificent dream, a moving challenge to those
who were then our teachers; to us who are their successors. It
was 54 years ago that he uttered these words, the very year this
great law school was established. The young men of whom he
spoke are now in their middle seventies. It is their grandchildren
who now fill our classrooms. Instead of 3500 there are today
over 9400 who go out into our land each year.
Not many years later, at the dedication of the Michigan Law
Quadrange, Mr. Justice Stone set forth with significant candor
that
"... Even those of us who have the most abiding faith in
our profession, and the firmest belief in its capacity for
future usefulness, . . . [must] admit that in our time the
Bar has not maintained its traditional position of public influence and leadership."
He then passed the responsibility directly to us, who educate
for the profession, by concluding:
"We may well pause to consider whether the professional
school has done well to neglect so completely the inculcation
3. 5 MiCn. L. REv. 344, 346 (1907), a paper read at the Annual Meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools, August 28, 1906.
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of some knowledge of the social responsibility which rests
upon a public profession.... It is not [he added] beyond the
power of institutions which have so successfully mastered
the art of penetrating all the intricacies of legal doctrine to
impart a truer understanding of the functions of those who
14

are to be its servants."

Now, a half century after Professor Mechem's dream of a
great contribution, and a quarter century after the Chief Justice
assigned us the proper but baffling task of giving it reality, we
come together to take stock of the meager responses we have
made.
The service of a professional man must exceed his competence
in ways that are both qualitative and quantitative. His is a
service of devotion and loyalty, so consuming as to place the welfare of client or patient beyond the convenience, beyond the comfort and, upon occasion, even beyond the personal welfare, of
the lawyer and physician. Moreover, it must be a service that
extends beyond this immediate relation of client or patient; it
must be a service to the community, to the unknown, unidentifiable human beings who make it up, who are, in a biblical sense,
our "neighbors."
It was "a certain lawyer," you will recall, whose inquiry
brought forth the famous parable of the Good Samaritan; who
asked Jesus the question, "Who is my neighbor?", and who,
when the victim of the thieves had been identified as the neighbor, was told by Jesus, "Go and do thou likewise." There is, I
think, a peculiar relevance today, this very afternoon, in the
fact that it was to a lawyer that Jesus was speaking when he
commanded him to do as the Good Samaritan had done, to go to
the aid of the afflicted and the victimized. Nor is it inappropriate to point out to our professional friends that the immediate
assistance given the victim was actually medical, for you will
recall, "he bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, set
him on his own beast and brought him to an inn and took care
of him." So it is, that in one simple story the way has been
pointed out to both of the professions whom we honor here today.
While it is not impossible that contemporary logic is based
on the Gospel according to Luke, I suspect that it is fully as
plausible that it is based on the circumstances that accompany
all professional education. After all, professional persons have
4. The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3, 13, 14 (1934).
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received far more from their educational institutions than they
will ever repay: free schooling, college tuitions that are scarcely
more than nominal, and a professional education that exceeds
by thousands of dollars our student fees. This means, of course
that it is the people of our states who provide these funds, the
people whom the Good Samaritan, were they in need, would deem
to be his neighbors. Those who have received so much, I claim,
are morally bound to make contribution of services to the communities that have afforded them these opportunities that so
few can enjoy. Moreover, it would be my conviction that, regardless of cost, those whose natural gifts have been enhanced
by the knowledge and training that only professional education
affords, have an abiding responsibility to use these gifts for the
social good as well as for their personal gain.5 This is no more
than minimal brotherhood.
But, you ask, how shall we educate our young people to sense
these responsibilities so deeply that they become in integral part
of their professional being?
Dr. Paul Tillich, a great theologian, has recently stressed
the importance of applying the "healing process" to the whole
man; conversely, he has warned us of the risk of healing a
bodily ailment without regard to a psychological or spiritual
disease from which the patient may equally suffer, and of the
risk that a healing in one area may occasion new dislocations
in others. It is here, certainly, that the ministerial and medical
professions have pioneered far ahead of us in law. Dr. James
L. Adams, of the Harvard Divinity School, has recently said,
"the minister is usually concerned with the total human person;
he performs diffuse or generalized functions"; his "status depends in part upon technical competence of the sort represented
by the theological discipline, theoretical and practical; but his
status in the church and community requires of him also that
he maintain a generalized responsibility which is not so clearly
based upon strictly professional skills." 6
Deans Severinghaus and Carman have emphasized this same
broad frame of reference in the field of medical education:
5. Chief Justice Stone, in another environment, expressed a not dissimilar
thought: "It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted
power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty
to exercise the power in their interest and behalf." Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
6. The Social Import of the Profcs8iOn, BULL. 23, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS 152, 163 (1958).
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"Only as the physician 'increases his resonance and ability
to respond to social human, and spiritual values,' [they say],
will he achieve his full professional and personal stature."'"
And a somewhat longer time ago a gentleman named Plato
observed: "To heal even an eye one must heal the head and indeed the whole body."
So it should be in preparing for the practice of law. Our aim
should be far beyond the development of competence in technical
and dialectical skills. It should comprise the "whole lawyer" in
all those relations into which the responsibility of professional
status will bring him.
Lawyers will be more than practitioners and judges. They
will also be legislators, corporate officers, and community leaders. For such tasks they must be fully educated and imbued with
a sense of obligation to use their competence in measurable degree for the benefit of others. This, after all, is but saying again
what Professor Mechem and Chief Justice Stone said so well not
many years ago.
There is, or so I believe, one particular ethical value so basic
that if we can communicate it to students it will serve as a point
of orientation for all their professional life. It is the value that
political democracy is built upon and which democratic institutions are established to preserve. It is the one value, which more
than all others, is accepted as having a spiritual source. It is
indeed the value that moved the Good Samaritan. It relates
intimately to human personality; it is, as best I can put it,
the recognition of the existence and worth of human personality.
It is my thesis that this is what determines all other ethical
values; that sincere and complete acceptance of this as a fundamental tenet will guide conduct so truly that recognition and
observance of other values will follow as night the day. To
whatever extent this acceptance is accomplished, be it ever so
large or ever so small, to that extent will there be assurance of
an ethical sense of responsibility. If this be so, our principal
concern should be to devise ways to convey a perception of this
value and to convey it so persuasively that it is consciously and
voluntarily accepted and that its acceptance is so sincere that it
7. SEVERINGHAUS, CARMAN & CADBURY, PREPARATION FOR MEDICAL EDUOATION IN THE LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGE 248 (1953), quoting in part, SMITH, EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(1948).
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will remain an ever present guide in the professional years
ahead.
Just how to accomplish this is, I venture to say, the single
most baffling problem in legal pedagogy. Traditionally we have
been guided by two views as to the teaching of ethics: one, that
the personality of the upright teacher radiates virtue, as it were,
so as to move the students to emulate his character; the other,
that the upright teacher uses every proper occasion in the midst
of his professional subject matter to elicit or to express an
opinion as to the propriety of the actor's conduct. That there
is a measure of merit in each of these contentions goes without
saying. Our teachers have accepted these views from time im-memorial yet, to our regret and shame, we must face the fact
that there still remains much that our students have failed to
learn regarding both the proprieties of their practice and their
public responsibilities.
What might be called the "noble exemplar" method operates,
in a sense, of its own accord, since the one sine qua non is readily
available, we are pleased to assume - namely, the upright
teacher. But the practice of pervading the curriculum with
ethical values requires an upright teacher who is also particularly gifted and dedicated - a man of perception, imagination,
initiative with a sense for systematic planning and a will to
undertake a careful analysis of the opportunities at hand. A few
years ago a committee of the Association of American Law
Schools were told by the deans of 45 of the member schools that
at least one faculty member on their staffs was using this approach. The names of 112 such teachers were provided. Individual follow-up letters to each of these professors elicited the
somewhat surprising replies that in fact only 26 of them actually
did so." This, I suggest, may be revealing in at least one of
-several ways. It may show how little deans know about what is
going on among their faculties; or how optimistic deans are;
or how extravagant will be their assurances when they detect
no prospect of being found out; and, in any event, it does show
how rare in fact is any planned systematic effort to introduce
ethical issues into non-ethics subject matter.
A more direct approach is used in over half our law schools;
this is by means of courses called Legal Ethics or Legal Profes8. Reports of Committee on Education for Professional Responsibility, PRO169 et seq. (1958),
98 et seq. '(1059).
CEEDINOS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAw SCHOOLS
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sion to which is entrusted virtually the entire responsibility of
turning out lawyers of proper moral character. So designated,
these courses are, unfortunately but not unnaturally, suspect
in student opinion, and communication falls upon ears that are
not as welcoming as we should like for effective teaching.
In all frankness, however, it should be admitted that courses
listed as ethics courses face two other handicaps as well. One
is often the absence of a current practitioner to give a special
reality, a visible assurance that much at least of Northrop's
"professed norms" are "living norms" as well. Another is the
nature of the casebooks now in use. These suffer from two
detractions: they largely concern peripheral or pathological conduct in which, one is relieved to believe, students from our better
schools will rarely be involved; the other is that they contain
an unconscionable number of opinions of Bar Committees, which
are, if I may say so, outstanding illustrations of how potentially
interesting subject matter can be desiccated by a style that is
dull, pedantic, and pedestrian, with all the fascination and excitement of Browning's Sordello.9
But this need not all be so hopeless. Interest can be greatly
stimulated by a series of prepared episodes, or problems, presenting predicaments of conduct facing a hypothetical lawyer.
These can be improvised from court opinions, committee opinions,
or best of all, from actual experience, and can be used as the
basis of class discussion, with the casebook retained as a repository of source materials to throw light on the solutions.
But there is, in my opinion, a vast area of yet unexplored
opportunities for a systematic planned introduction of ethical
values and standards into non-ethics courses; for what some of
us, in the language of the late Dr. Edwin E. Aubrey, have come
to call "the pervasive approach." 10 I would suspect that this
may well be true in medical pedagogy too, but the probabilities
are far better in law because we are dealing with rectification
of harm done by the conduct of people, rather than of bacteria,
viruses, chemistry, or physics. If the teacher can bring himself
to accept the proposition that discussion of the propriety of con9. According to the late William Lyon Phelps, one of the great teachers of
English of all times, there are only two lines of this two hundred page poem that
he could understand, the first and the last, and both of them are false. They read:
"Who will, may hear Sordello's story told" and "Who would, has heard Sordello's
story told."
10. See STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 245, 385
(1959).
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duct of people other than lawyers is helpful in the sense of transferability to the conduct of lawyers themselves, and if he will
take a few hours from a busy week and analyze his course case
by case and class-note by class-note, he will be amazed at the
discoverable number of ethical issues that are implicit in every
hour of class discussion, that are latent, ready for delineation
and discussion, that pervade, in fact, the entire course.
This is an approach that has scarcely been explored. It offers
one great pedagogical advantage over today's neatly labeled
ethics courses composed entirely of questions involving the conduct of lawyers. It will be the advantage that ethical problems,
involving values comparable to those faced by lawyers, will be
identified and discussed in non-ethics environments in which
the student will accept them as relevant.
Two other approaches are now emerging from their experimental period. One is a special course, constructed out of nonethics subject matter but made up of problems selected because
they include a particular ethical value that the instructor believes
important. Often, because of the prevalence there of the value
of personality, this is in the civil liberties area, but for the same
reason, a course in family law, criminal law, or trusts would also
be suitable. In my own case, I have projected a series of problems all relating to what I have called the ultimate value, respect
for the dignity of personality. The subject matter commences
with a problem on the nature of freedom and the burden of
decision-making that goes with it; it continues with individual
rights under international treaties; then the right to travel and
a sequence of problems concerning the nature of a fair hearing
before courts, legislative committees, administrative bodies, arbitrators, and disciplinary proceedings in labor unions. In each,
the core issue is the place of the individual, the respect due him
as a person and the restrictions on his freedom necessitated by
the safety or welfare of society.11 Training is in research and
analysis, but the important by-product is the significance of the
individual.
What seems, however, to show perhaps the greatest prospect
of usefulness is the cooperative lawyer-student discussion groups.
With the splendid and sympathetic aid of the Columbus Bar
Association I have experimented with this approach for now five
years.
11. For discussion, see id. at 403.
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It has one risk: the dire one that the lawyers, quick to seize
so enticing an opportunity to indulge their principal professional
weapon, loquacity, will make speeches or reminisce about the
many youthful errors from which they have learned so much.
A reasonably sure protection, however, is the preparation of a
series of problems, distributed in advance to both lawyers and
students and used for purposes of question and answer, analysis
and conclusion.
There must be, of course, an orderly pattern of topics at these
discussions, but if six or seven problems, written in the form of
hypothetical questions, are prepared for each subject, they are
certain to yield a valuable two-hour discussion. They should all,
of course, concern issues of personal conduct faced by lawyers
and the discussion should be directed to the propriety of what
they did or should do, and why. In the program with which I
am familiar we cover, among others, the ethical aspects of building a law practice, fee charging, preparation and conduct of
trials, conflict of interests, confidential communications, and the
responsibilities of the lawyer in the life of his community.
An almost overwhelming advantage of this is that the students
meet and actually get acquainted with practicing lawyers. They
come to realize from personal contacts that lawyers do have
standards that they actually do apply to their own conduct, and
that what the students have read is no mere facade, set up to
conceal activities and ideals far different from those professed
by bar associations and law professors. In short, they come to
realize that the leaders of our bar believe and hold to what I
have called the basic value of respect for the personality of another.12
But another aspect of this value should be pointed out. In
the area of group action it is fully as basic as is respect for the
individual in his personal relations.
Many years ago an aggregation of young men framed the
structure of the government we revere today. Like many men
still in their twenties and thirties, they had daring, a capacity
for decision making, and a determination to carry out their
chosen plans. But if these had been their only qualities who can
say what protections would have been afforded those basic
12. Undoubtedly the most complete and most thoughtful discussion of these
various approaches is found id. at 223 et seq., where lawyer-student programs are
presented.
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freedoms of the individual that are today the hallmark of the
Free World.
When one considers how young these men were he can hardly
avoid the question: would today's young men have done as well?
Surely they have courage, decisiveness, determination. All these
we'saw brilliantly displayed in the late war. For these we shall
always give our gratitude and admiration. Our uneasiness must
lie elsewhere. It lies, I believe, in our uncertainty as to their
sense of values, as to what it is that matters to them most deeply;
what it is that stirs their imagination, gives them vision and
impels them to action.
If that dread happening should ever come about, a military
conflict with weapons of annihilation, there will be no time to
mobilize and apply the brave qualities of our young men of
1941-45. Our only chance of survival is now, in the immediate
years ahead, when world conflict is still at the level of ideas.
"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men
that the defences of peace must be constructed." So speaks the
Constitution of UNESCO. It is to us in the professional schools
that has been entrusted the guidance of those minds that more
than any others will be making tomorrow's decisions. It is our
particular responsibility, then, to inculcate into these minds
those same values that gave us a leadership capable of building
the structure that Gladstone so undyingly pictured, on the occasion of another centennial, as "the most wonderful work ever
13
struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man."'
The foundation stone of that structure is the respect for the
personality of the individual. Originally considered implicit, it
became explicit in 1791 when principles that had been assumed
by many as obvious were made an integral part of our Constitution. It is this respect, this single fundamental value, that assures our people freedom and dignity, that distinguishes the
great democratic tradition from the totalitarianism of Soviet
Russia. Also it is this same respect that in our smaller world
stimulates community leadership and service; that leads our
lawyers and our doctors into the acceptance of the responsibilities that make them truly professional men.
True respect for the person finds institutional expression in
13. Kin Beyond the ,Sea, NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW (Sept. 1878) ; later repeated in substance in his letter to the Committee in charge of the celebration of
the Centennial of the American Constitution, July 20, 1887.
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the kind of government we call American democracy. To lawyers this is the Bill of Rights and procedural due process of law.
It is respect for the individual embodied in the structure of government itself; two facets of the same value, the one the idea
and the other the group form in which it finds expression.
Respect for our institutions of government must inevitably
mean respect for their functions and their pronouncements. In
our responsive form of government, the means are always at
hand to bring about change. Lawyers above all know this. They
also know that it behooves them, of all people, to honor the
declarations and adjudications of these institutions so long as
they remain unchanged by orderly process. The fundamental
right of freedom to criticize must be exercised against a background of law observance. This too is a professional responsibility. Unhappily, it is a responsibility that the organized bar
has been far too slow to appreciate. It is a responsibility which
it is our particular obligation to communicate; for lawyers who
seek to put themselves beyond the law do no honor to either our
law schools or our profession.
By the very nature of their calling, no persons are as well
qualified to perceive these duties as are lawyers. For three short
years we who teach law have them in our classrooms, ready at
hand to learn to think and act like members of an honored profession. As we pause here for a few moments in the halls of a
great institution of learning, celebrating its full century of service and commemorating the achievements and ideals of two distinguished professional colleges, it is fitting that we take note
of this: it is at once our great opportunity and our great obligation to encourage these future lawyers and doctors to understand
the one value on which all ethics rest and which American institutions were built to serve - the value of human personality.
Our principal challenge today is to devise a way to make this so
clear, so significant, so precious, that our students will some day
dedicate their careers to make it live. That, I believe, is the major responsibility of us who have undertaken to educate the professions of the future.

